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Introduction
In  the  summer  of  1906,  Atlanta,  a  city  previously  known  for  relatively 
peaceful race relations, saw a spate of newspaper coverage of black attacks on 
whites, in particular white women. (“Bold Negro Kisses White Girl's Hand,” 
screamed one headline.) On September 22nd, four assaults upon white women 
were reported. Armed with guns, a group of whites went downtown to a black 
neighbourhood  and  attacked  black  men,  killing  25.1 None  of  the  original 
alleged assaults were later substantiated.
Laboratory  experiments  have  persuaded  many  economists  that  humans  are 
reciprocators,  who will  pay so as to punish actions they perceive as unfair 
towards them or others (Rabin 1993;  Fehr and Gaechter  2000; Bolton and 
Ockenfels  2000).  Examples  like  the  above  suggest  that  people  sometimes 
strike back, not against  the individual  who caused the perceived harm, but 
against other people in that individual's group. In these cases, those punished 
may have nothing to do with the initial offence, and the offender himself may 
be completely unaffected by the retaliation.  We call  this kind of retaliation 
group reciprocity.
1 Bauerlein (2001).
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Group  reciprocity  appears  widespread  in  human  conflict,  including  riots, 
pogroms and ethnic civil wars. Many such episodes involve calls for revenge 
against  an  opposing group for  previous  harms,  whether real  or  imaginary, 
recent or ancient.2 Indeed, grievances over previous conflicts may provide the 
cause or pretext for  further outbreaks, leading to cycles of violence.3 These 
cycles  hinder  development in  many  of  the  world's  poorest  states  (World 
Development Report 2011).
Group  reciprocity  can  also  be  seen  in  ordinary  economic  behaviour. 
Consumers  may  boycott  the  produce  of  countries  whose  policies  they 
disapprove of,  or products offered by specific ethnic groups.  In 2010, during 
the European financial  crisis,  a German news magazine headline described 
Greeks as “Crooks in the European Family”. This led to a boycott of German 
products in Greece. Later, when Greek protesters used Nazi symbols to protest 
bailout conditions, the tabloid Das Bild commented  “We pay – and still get 
insulted!” Such  cycles  of  recrimination  may  affect  voters'  support  for 
Eurozone  bailouts  (Daily  Telegraph  2010;  Reuters  2011).  Companies,  too, 
may  be targets for group reciprocity.  In 1995, after  the Shell  Corporation's 
2 For numerous examples, see Horowitz (1985; 2001).
3 For the role of grievance in civil wars, see Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon and Laitin 
(2003),  as well as the literature review in Blattman and Miguel (2010).  For its  role in 
terrorism see Krueger and Maleckova (2003).
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decision to sink the oil drilling platform “Brent Spar” in the North Sea, several 
Shell  petrol  stations  in  Germany  received  bomb  threats,  and  at  least  one 
actually received a letter bomb (Die Welt 1995). Lastly, group reciprocity may 
be positive as well as negative: football fan communities sometimes maintain 
bonds of friendship, established by acts of generosity such as refraining from 
physical assault on specific occasions (Koester 2008).  
Although  group  reciprocal  behaviour has  been  attested  beyond  reasonable 
doubt,  we  know  little  about  the  motivations behind  it.  Acts  of  group 
reciprocity could be undertaken by materially self-interested, rational actors. 
For example, boycotting a country's exports may be seen as an effective way 
to change its policies. Striking back against groups may help someone to build 
a reputation for toughness. Or, not doing so might expose one to punishment 
from others in one's  own group: one eyewitness  of the Rwandan genocide 
stated “ten percent helped; 30 percent were forced to kill; 20 percent killed 
reluctantly; 40 percent killed enthusiastically” (Mamdani 2001). However, as 
this quote suggests, it is also possible that some people may group-reciprocate 
even when there is no strategic incentive to do so. These people will act as if 
group fairness is  a primitive in their  utility  function: they simply prefer to 
harm (or help) members of groups who have harmed (helped) them.4
4 We do not propose a particular functional form for group-reciprocal utility in this paper. 
Moreno (2008) models group fairness on the lines of Rabin (1993).
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To  investigate  whether  this  is  the  case,  we  ran  laboratory  experiments  in 
which there  was  no strategic incentive to group-reciprocate. Subjects in the 
experiments were  divided  into  groups.  Each  group  jointly  completed a 
cooperative task. Then, each subject played a Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) against 
a partner who was a member of a different group. After  play in the PD was 
revealed,  subjects made decisions allocating money between themselves and 
members of other groups. We compare each subject's allocations to the fellow 
group members of their partner in the PD, with their allocations to members of 
a different group with which they had not previously interacted.  Using this 
other group  as  a  control,  we  can  test whether  subjects'  PD  partners' 
cooperation or defection affected their allocations specifically to the partner's 
group.
Our main findings are as follows. While the majority of our subjects do not 
group-reciprocate,  and indeed do not  discriminate  at  all  between groups,  a 
minority  of subjects  do group-reciprocate.  In particular,  we find significant 
evidence of group reciprocity in punishment decisions, where subjects must 
pay to harm others. However, we do not observe group reciprocity in dictator 
games where harming others benefits the subject.  Lastly, we examine some 
possible correlates of group reciprocity.  Although group reciprocity  is only 
induced when subjects cooperated and their partner defected, subjects who are 
more  cooperative  in  general are  no  more  likely  to  group-reciprocate  than 
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others. Group reciprocity is also not predicted by a psychological measure of 
group identification.
In  the  next  section  we  review  the  relevant  literature,  and  explain  our 
contribution. We then describe our experiments and results.
Related Literature
Economists have long been interested in the economic consequences of groups 
and  ethnicity  (Becker  1957;  Arrow  1972;  Akerlof  1976).  More  recently, 
economic  experimentalists  have focused on how group membership affects 
behaviour, a topic that has long fascinated social psychologists (Sumner 1906; 
Sherif  et  al.  1961; Tajfel  et  al.  1971).  Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo (2009) 
show  experimentally  that  people  will  put  a  monetary  value  on  group 
membership. Further, people discriminate between in- and outgroups.  They 
cooperate  more  with  in-group  members  (de  Cremer  and  van  Vugt  1999; 
Goette and Huffman 2006, Guala et al. 2009; but cf. Bouckaert and Dhaene 
2004); give in-group members more, reward them more for good behaviour, 
and punish them less (Chen and Li 2009); they also punish offenders more 
when  the  victim  is  an  in-group  member  (Goette  and  Huffman  op.  cit., 
Bernhard et al. 2006). Debate continues over whether this different behaviour 
is driven by expectations of future reciprocity (Yamagishi and Kiyonari 2000; 
Yamagishi and Mifune 2008, 2009) or by pure preferences (Guala et al. 2009).
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As psychologists  have  noted  (Brewer  1999),  ingroup bias  per se does  not 
imply that people will behave unkindly towards members of an outgroup, only 
that  they  will  behave  more  kindly  towards  members  of  their  ingroup.  For 
example, when asked to allocate a “bad” (exposure to aversive noise) among 
ingroup and outgroup members, members of a minimal groups did not favour 
the ingroup (Mummendey et al. 1992). Therefore, ingroup bias alone may not 
explain  the  empirical  regularity  that  many  real-world  conflicts  involve 
appalling  intergroup  violence  (Brewer  op.  cit.).   Dispositions  to  group 
reciprocity may be a missing part of the story. Individual biases towards one's 
own group, which are (relatively) innocuous in ordinary circumstances,  can 
become more dangerous after a perceived threat or insult from another group. 
Psychologists  have  investigated  indirect  group  reciprocity  (i.e. reciprocity 
towards groups in retaliation for harms done to other members of one's own 
group) under the term “vicarious retribution” (Lickel et al. 2006). Stenstrom et 
al. (2008) show that subjects will verbally express a demand for sanctions in 
retaliation for a presumed intergroup insult. In Gaertner et al. (2008), subjects 
allocated unpleasant noise to a group one of whose members had rejected the 
subject.
Group reciprocity may also help to explain the harmful intergroup behaviour 
observed in some lab experiments.  Abbink and Herrmann (2009) created a 
ten-round vendetta game between two groups: in each round, subjects could 
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deduct money from the other group, at a cost to themselves. The low observed 
rates of this inefficient behaviour (13%) were tripled (40%) by the addition of 
a symbolic reward. Suggestively, rates of harmful actions were increased by 
the other group's harmful actions in the previous round, although since the 
group  included  the  person  who  chose  the  previous  harmful  action,  group 
reciprocity cannot be clearly distinguished here from individual reciprocity. 
By contrast, Halevy et al. (2008) observe very low rates of intergroup harm 
when an option to benefit one's own group without harming the other group 
was available; this was a one-shot game, with less scope for  group reciprocity 
to operate.
Similarly, some results from field data are compatible with group reciprocity. 
Shayo and Zussman (2010) show that Israeli judges were more likely to find 
in  favour of Israeli  plaintiffs  against  Arab defendants shortly  after  terrorist 
incidents. This could be explained by increased solidarity with the ingroup, or 
by bias against an outgroup perceived as responsible for an attack;  a point 
favouring the former interpretation is that Arab judges were also more likely 
to find in favour of Arabs against Israelis after an attack. In a military context, 
Kocher  et  al.  (2008)  show  that  indiscriminate  US  bombing  in  Vietnam 
increased Vietcong control, suggesting that it drove Vietnamese civilians “into 
the arms of the rebels”.
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We see our contribution as follows. We test experimentally, using real money 
payoffs, whether  people  will  reciprocate  the actions  of  one group member 
when they make choices affecting other members of that group. Our design 
rules out strategic motivations, including expectations about others' behaviour 
towards oneself and reputational considerations. We clearly distinguish group 
from individual  reciprocity,  by  ensuring  that  subjects  knew they  were  not 
harming (helping) the person who had harmed (helped) them, but rather others 
from that person's group. By having subjects make allocations to multiple out-
groups,  we  also  differentiate  reciprocity  towards  a  specific  group  from 
generalized reciprocity towards third parties (Dufwenberg et al. 2001, Nowak 
and  Roch  2007).  Thus,  the laboratory  setting  allows  us  to  identify  group 
reciprocal behaviour more cleanly than would be possible with field data.
Experiments have been run both with lab-created groups (Tajfel et al. 1971; 
Hargreaves  Heap  and  Zizzo  2009;  Guala  et  al.  2009;  Chen  and  Li  2009; 
Yamagishi and Kiyonari 2000; Yamagishi and Mifune 2008, 2009; de Cremer 
and van Vugt 1999) and with naturally occurring groups (Sherif et al. 1961; 
Fershtman  and  Gneezy  2001;  Bouckaert  and  Dhaene  2004; Goette  and 
Huffman 2006; Bernhard et al. 2006; Habyarimana et al. 2009). We chose to 
use lab-created groups in our experiment, for two reasons. First, lab-created 
groups reduce the likelihood that subjects will bring into the lab set patterns of 
intergroup  behaviour,  which  might  have  a  strategic  or  group-reputational 
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component. Second, lab groups are relatively easy to create without access to a 
specific subject pool, and this contributes to our goal of developing a simply 
reusable  experimental  paradigm.  We  also  note  that  the  use  of  lab-created 
groups arguably provides a stronger test of group reciprocal motivations than 
using powerful existing identities such as ethnicity. Nevertheless, we believe 
that future tests of group reciprocity with naturally occurring groups will also 
be interesting and important.
Experimental Design
We ran two experiments. Both experiments shared the following sequence of 
events.  First,  subjects  were separated  into colour-coded groups.  Second,  to 
increase  group  identification,  subjects  performed  a  collective  task.  Third, 
subjects were paired with members of other groups, and played a Prisoner's 
Dilemma (PD). Following Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), we think defection in 
a PD would be considered a norm violation by many of our subjects.5 Fourth, 
after  the  PD,  subjects  completed  allocation  tasks  involving  themselves, 
members of their PD partner's group (but not the PD partners themselves), and 
members  of  a  third  group  with  whom they  had  not  previously  interacted. 
Defection by a subject's  PD partner might affect  the subject's  behaviour to 
5 Note, however,  that we chose a simultaneous PD game, whereas Fehr and Fischbacher 
(2004) analysed a sequential PD.
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members of all other groups, not just to members of the partner's group; we 
use the allocations to the third group to control for this. 
Our basic empirical model is
(1) givingi,g = f(αi + κ Self Di + λ Partner Di + μ (Partner Di × Self Di) 
+  Xiβ +  γ  Pgrpg +  δ (Pgrpg × Self Di) +  ζ (Pgrpg × Partner Di) +  η 
(Pgrpg × Partner Di × Self Di) + Pgrpg × Ziθ + εi,g)
Here, givingi,g is the amount given by individual i to a member of group g ∈ 
{Partner,Other}. Pgrpg is 1 if g is the group of the subject's PD partner, and 0 
otherwise. Self Di is 1 if subject i defected in the PD and 0 otherwise. Partner  
Di is  1  if  the  subject's  PD partner  defected  and  0  otherwise. We  interact 
Partner  Di with  Self  Di because  it  is  plausible  that  subjects  will  react 
differently if they cooperated, but their partner defected, than if both they and 
their  partner  defected.  Parameters  κ,  λ  and  μ capture  the  effect  of  these 
covariates upon total amounts given. Our parameters of interest, however, are 
ζ  and  η.  These are  the effect  of  the  PD partner's  defection  specifically  on 
giving to the Partner group, above any effect on giving to the Other group. ζ 
gives the effect for subjects  who are themselves PD cooperators and (ζ+η) 
gives the total  effect for subjects  who are defectors.  Lastly,  αi is a subject 
specific  intercept,  Xi is  a  vector  of  known  covariates  which  may  affect 
subjects' giving to all groups, and  Zi is a vector of known covariates which 
may influence subjects' giving to the Partner group alone. Subjects' individual 
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propensities to give, αi, are highly likely to be correlated with their behaviour 
in the PD, and therefore with values of Self D and Self D × Partner D. For this 
reason, we treat  αi as a fixed effect. If our specification were linear (f(x)=x), 
then we could use first-differencing to eliminate both the fixed effects and all 
the terms affecting amounts given in general, leaving:
(2)   givingi,partner –  givingi,other  =  γ +  δ Self  Di +  ζ Partner  Di +  η 
(Partner Di × Self Di) + Ziθ + εi,partner – εi,other
Our data is not suitable for a linear model in either experiment, so that naïve 
first-differencing will not work, but we use estimation strategies based upon 
the same idea.
For clarity and ease of comparison, the sequence of treatments and choices in 
both experiments is illustrated in Table 1 below. The complete description of 
the experiments follows.
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Subjects Pre-Group Stage Group Formation Post-Group PD Allocation Task Post-experiment
E
xp
er
im
en
t 1
180 subject in 6 
sessions.
3 groups per 
session.
10 members per 
group.
1 ECU = 1 
EURO.
None. Random assignment 
into colour-coded 
groups.
Task: group 
pelmanism game. 5 
ECU for winners.
Players endowed with 2 
ECU and choose actions 
A or B. Payoffs in ECU:
A B
A +2,+2 -2,+5
B +5,-2 -1,-1
10 randomly ordered binary choices 
allocating money. Players choose A or 
B. Payoffs shown in Table 2. 
Questionnaire. Pelmanism 
winners revealed. 
Payment: 2.50 EURO show 
up fee plus pelmanism + PD 
+ results of 1 randomly 
chosen allocation per 
subject.
E
xp
er
im
en
t 2
172 subjects in 10 
sessions.
6 groups per 
session.6
3 members per 
group.
100 ECU = £1.
Anonymous 
Prisoner's Dilemma 
with random other 
participant. Results 
revealed at end.
Random assignment 
into colour-coded 
groups.
Task: quiz on 
animal collective 
names, with group 
chat. 1000 ECU for 
winners. 100 ECU 
for losers.
Players endowed with 
200 ECU and choose 
actions A or B. Payoffs 
in ECU:
A B
A +200,+200 -200,+500
B +500,-200 -100,-100
6 randomly ordered continuous choices 
allocating money.
3 dictator games with taking frame: other 
participant has 1000 ECU and subject 
can take 0-1000 ECU.
3 punishment games: subject has 400 
ECU, other participant has 900 ECU. 
Subject can spend up to 300 ECU to 
punish. Each ECU spent reduces other's 
payoff by 3 ECU.
Each game played: once with random 
member of Own group, once with 
random member of Partner group (not 
PD partner him/herself), once with 
random member of (an) Other group. 
Other participant identified by group and 
number.
Questionnaire.  Initial PD 
results and quiz winners 
revealed. 
Payment: £5 showup fee 
plus:
Sessions 1-5: 1 chosen at 
random from: initial PD, 
quiz, second PD or 
allocation results (from one 
randomly chosen allocation 
per subject).
Sessions 6-10: at random, 
either initial PD + quiz or 
second PD  + allocation 
results.
TABLE 1: EXPERIMENT DESIGN SUMMARY
6 One session had 5 groups; 5 groups in total, over 4 sessions, had only 2 members.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was run at the Jena laboratory of the Max Planck Institute for 
Economics,  using  the  computer  software  zTree  (Fischbacher  2007).7 180 
subjects,  recruited via ORSEE (Greiner 2004),  took part  during 6 sessions. 
Each  session  lasted  about  1  hour.  Subjects  were  paid  in  Experimental 
Currency Units (ECU), with 1 ECU = 1 Euro.
In each session, 30 subjects were randomly allocated into three groups named 
red, green and blue. Each subject was given a player number, running from 1-
10 within each group. These numbers, together with the group names, were 
used  to  identify  subjects  to  each  other  throughout  the  remainder  of  the 
experiment. In order to increase group identification and entitativity (the sense 
that each group forms a single entity), each group played a team game. This 
was an adapted version of the card game Pelmanism, in which players have to 
find pairs of identical cards from a face-down deck. In our computer version, 
the  whole  group  anonymously  voted  for  which  card  to  turnover,  and  one 
selected member then observed the votes and chose a card. The group which 
found  the  most  pairs  was  awarded  5  ECU.  The  winning  group  was  not 
revealed until the end of the experiment.
7 Screenshots of the interface are available online in the file screenshots.zip
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After  the  Pelmanism  game,  subjects  were  allocated  into  pairs,  each  pair 
containing subjects from two different groups. They were informed of their 
partner's  group  and  player  number.  They  then  played  a  one-shot  PD. 
Afterwards,  subjects  were  shown  their  partner's  choices  and  the  resulting 
payoffs for both players. We call each subject's PD partner's group the Partner 
group; the remaining group is the Other group. For instance, if a red group 
member played the PD against a green group member, then for her the green 
group is the Partner group, and the blue group is the Other group.
Choice set 1 2 3 4 5
Choice A B A B A B A B A B
ECU allocated to... ECU allocated to...
Self   2 1 4 3 1 2 4 5 Target 1 1 2
Target   5 2 3 0 4 1 3 0 Target 2 3 1
1P-4P: Target is from Partner group; 
1O-4O: Target is from Other group.
5P:  Target  1  is  from  Partner 
group,  Target  2  is  from  Other 
group.  5O:  Target  1  is  from 
Other  group,  Target  2  is  from 
Partner group.
TABLE 2: ALLOCATIONS IN EXPERIMENT 1
Lastly,  each  subject  made  a  set  of  ten  binary  choices,  allocating  money 
between  him-  or  herself  and  one  or  more  other  subjects  (the  “target(s)”), 
always identified by their player number and group. The choices are shown in 
Table 2. Subjects chose between allocation A and allocation B. There are five 
pairs of similar choices; we refer to each pair as a “choice set”. In each choice 
set, subjects faced tradeoffs between maximizing their own income, helping 
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the target,  and increasing or decreasing inequality. Choice sets 1-4 allocate 
money to the subject him- or herself and to one other target. Choice B always 
gives less to the target. Choice sets 1 and 2 involve “punishment choices”: the 
subject can either maximize  his own and the other's income, or pay to reduce 
the other's income. They also have distributional consequences: the income-
maximizing choice in set 1 is unequal in the other's favour, compared to the 
alternative. In set 2, the income-maximizing choice is less unequal than the 
alternative. Choice sets 3 and 4 are “dictator” choices: the subject can either 
maximize his own income, or reduce his income but give more to the other. In 
set 3 the selfish allocation also reduces other-favouring inequality; in set 4 it 
increases  self-favouring  inequality.  Each  of  choice  sets  1-4  is  made  once 
where the target is a member of the Partner group (1P-4P) and once when the 
target is a member of the Other group (1O-4O). Two allocations, 5P and 5O, 
were between a Partner group member and an Other group member, with the 
subject  herself  not being  involved.  The choice  here was which of  the two 
groups to favour; A is the efficient choice. By comparing subjects' decisions 
within each pair of choices in a choice set, we can observe the effect of the 
target's group membership. 
Subjects never made allocations involving their previous PD partner – only 
involving other members of the same group. They could easily observe this, 
because the PD partner's group and player number, along with the outcome of 
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the  PD,  was  shown  onscreen  (in  a  “history  box”)  throughout  the  10 
allocations. The order of the allocations was randomized. At the end of the 
experiment a single allocation was randomly selected, and the relevant payoffs 
were implemented.
After  the  experiment,  subjects  were  given  a  questionnaire  including 
demographics,  measures  of  group  identity,  and  debriefing  questions.  The 
winning group of the Pelmanism game was then revealed.  Finally,  subjects 
were  called  up  and  paid  privately  for  their  winnings  from the  Pelmanism 
game,  the Prisoner's  Dilemma,  and the randomly selected  allocations  (their 
own and others'). Each subject also received a 2.50 Euro showup fee. 
Two points about this design deserve attention. First, allocation into groups 
and of PD partners within groups was random, and prior to the PD, subjects 
had no interaction with groups other than their own. Hence, in what follows, 
we can treat subjects' PD partners' cooperation or defection as an exogenous 
variable. Second, subjects knew that the allocations were the last part of the 
experiment. Therefore, in making allocation decisions, they had no strategic 
reasons to play a particular way (e.g. reputation-building). These comments 
also apply to Experiment 2. Descriptive statistics for our subjects are shown in 
Table 3. 
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N 180
Demographics
Male 142 (78.89%)
Age Min 19, max 67, mean 24.6, median 24
Studying:
… Law 8 (4.44%) … Natural sciences 38 (21.11%)
… Social sciences 56 (31.11%) … Other 38 (21.11%)
… Economics 27 (15.00%) … Not a student 13 (7.22%)
Prisoner's Dilemma choices (self, partner)
CC 72 (40.00%) DC 44 (24.44%)
CD 44 (24.44%) DD 20 (11.11%)
Allocations (those choosing option B)
Choice set 1P 20 (11.11%) Choice set 1O 24 (13.33%)
Choice set 2P 10 (5.56%) Choice set 2O 7 (3.89%)
Choice set 3P 158 (87.78%) Choice set 3O 154 (85.56%)
Choice set 4P 104 (57.78%) Choice set 4O 94 (52.22%)
Choice set 5P 71 (39.44%) Choice set 5O 80 (44.44%)
TABLE 3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, EXPERIMENT 1
Figure 1 shows the percentage of B choices made in each of the 10 allocations, 
split by whether the PD partner cooperated or defected. In choice sets 1-4, B is 
the decision that  gives least  to  the target.  In general, PD partner  defection 
increases  the  proportion  of  B  choices.  In  choice  set  1,  partner  defection 
decreases unkind choices (which also reduce the subject's own payoff), but 
more so towards the Other group than towards the Partner group. Patterns for 
the other choice sets are less clear.
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Table 4 tabulates the pairs of choices made by our subjects in each choice set, 
split  up  by  whether  the  PD  partner  cooperated  or  defected.  In  order  to 
investigate whether PD partner's defection affected discriminatory behaviour, 
we examine only those subjects who discriminated either for or against the 
Partner  group.  If  PD  partner  behaviour  does  not  affect  the  level  of 
discrimination,  i.e.  if  ζ=η=0  in  equation  (1),  then  there  should  be  no 
association between partner behaviour and the proportion, among those who 
discriminate in either direction, of those who discriminate against the Partner 
group. The final row of Table 4 shows the results of the corresponding Fisher 
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FIGURE 1: ALLOCATION DECISIONS BY PD PARTNER BEHAVIOUR, EXPERIMENT 
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test.8 Only the first choice set shows a significant effect: PD partner defection 
was associated with more discrimination against the Other group. Apparently, 
subjects who had been defected against were more willing to harm the target 
when the target was from the Partner group.  
Choice set 1 2 3 4 5
PD Partner C D C D C D C D C D
Choice P/Choice O
A/A 94 56 111 56 9 5 47 19 53 28
A/B 8 2 0 3 6 2 7 3 18 10
B/A 1 5 3 3 10 2 9 11 12 7
B/B 13 1 2 2 91 55 53 31 33 19
Fisher test, A/B or 
B/A  vs  Partner  C 
or D
0.0350* 0.464 1 0.260 1
C = PD partner cooperated. D = PD partner defected. + p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; 
*** p < 0.001.
TABLE 4: PARTNER AND OTHER GROUP ALLOCATIONS BY PD PARTNER 
BEHAVIOUR, EXPERIMENT 1
To separate out the effect of partner defection on defectors and cooperators, 
we run logit regressions. Thus, in equation (1), we take 
f(x)=GA if x>0; GB otherwise
in each of the five choice sets, where  GJ is the amount given to the target by 
choice  J in {A,B}, and we assume that  εi,g has a logistic distribution.  Fixed 
8 We use a Fisher test rather than a chi-squared test because the Fisher test is exact when 
there are small numbers in each cell, as in this case. 
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effects logits  failed to converge in 2 out of 5 regressions, probably because 
this approach ignores subjects who made the same choice against both Partner 
and  Other  group  members,  leaving insufficient  cases  for  estimation.  As  a 
second  best,  we  estimate  random  effects  logits.  Table  5 reports  selected 
coefficients.  For each choice set,  the first  column comes from a regression 
without controls (i.e. with X and Z empty). Controls are not necessary, since 
the  main  variable  Partner  D is  guaranteed  to  be  exogenous  by  the 
experimental design, but appropriate controls will increase the accuracy of our 
estimates in the nonlinear logit model. The second column adds a vector of 
controls  to  both  X  and  Z: dummies  for  gender,  for  subjects  studying 
economics, and for group colour. The third column adds the controls and also 
a  vector  of  session  dummies.9 The  coefficients  of  interest  are  quite  stable 
across these specifications. Partner D significantly predicts less generosity to 
the partner group in choice set 1 only, although this variable approaches weak 
significance in choice set 4. The Partner D × Self D interaction is significant 
in choice set 5, but this is not easy to interpret, since the coefficient on Partner  
D is small and insignificant. Thus, group reciprocity was only evident in one 
out of the five choice sets. 
9 Regressions for choice set 2 failed to converge and are omitted. It is clear from Table 4 
that partner defection would not be significant in choice set 2, under any specification.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Choice set 1 1 1 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 5
Pgrp 2.47 -0.67 -2.12 -0.97 -0.98 -0.93 -0.29 -0.78 -0.77 -0.4 -0.49 -0.5
(1.64) (9.2) (11.48) (0.8) (2.55) (2.53) (0.53) (1.12) (1.21) (0.41) (0.84) (0.85) 
Pgrp × ...
Partner D -9.37 -8.02 -7.81 0.67 1.99 1.89 -1.35 -1.4 -1.63 -0.77 -0.92 -0.96
(4.2)* (4.05)* (3.88)* (1.68) (3.04) (3) (0.88) (0.93) (1.04) (0.68) (0.72) (0.73) 
Self D 6.87 8.12 8.67 0.19 1.78 1.54 0.29 0.41 0.41 0.07 0.11 0.13
(7.73) (9.38) (10.17) (1.41) (2.55) (2.51) (0.84) (0.9) (0.97) (0.67) (0.68) (0.7) 
Partner D × Self D 0.02 -2.31 -1.87 0.06 1.08 1.32 0.85 0.76 0.92 2.59 2.79 2.86
(8.86) (10.65) (10.28) (2.74) (5.33) (5.32) (1.47) (1.54) (1.66) (1.2)* (1.26)* (1.27)*
Log Likelihood -75.99 
(9 df)
-73.32 
(19 df)
-72.99 
(24 df)
-106.37 
(9 df)
-96.7 
(19 df)
-96.31 
(24 df)
-208.46 
(9 df)
-204.23 
(19 df)
-196.94 
(24 df)
-225.67 
(9 df)
-217.99 
(19 df)
-210.94 
(24 df)
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Session dummies No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Dependent variable is choice favouring Partner group (A in choice sets 1-4, B in choice set 5). Controls: gender, group  colour, economics student, 
Partner group decision taken before Other group decision. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
TABLE 5: RANDOM EFFECTS LOGITS, EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 2
Experiment  1  produced  evidence  for  group  reciprocity  in  1  out  of  2 
punishment choices, with little evidence for group reciprocity in the dictator 
choices (sets 3 and 4). To confirm these results, we ran a second experiment.  
In this design, subjects made continuous rather than binary choices at the final 
stage.  By allowing subjects finer-grained control over their allocations, we 
hoped to get more accurate estimates of the distribution of group reciprocal 
preferences  in  the  population.  We  also  changed  our  group  identity 
manipulation to increase levels of group identification. The new manipulation 
was  a  quiz  on  collective  animal  names,  allowing  for  computer-based  chat 
among participants of the same group.10 
Experiment 2 was run at the University of Warwick experimental laboratory, 
again using zTree. 172 subjects, recruited from the subject pool via ORSEE, 
participated in 10 sessions. Subjects were paid in ECU, this time with 100 
ECU = £1. At the start  of the experiment,  subjects were informed that the 
experiment  had  4  stages,  and  that  instructions  for  each  stage  would  be 
revealed prior to the stage itself. In stage 1, subjects were randomly paired to 
play an initial PD, the results of which were not revealed until the end of the 
10 Pretests  showed that  this  manipulation was successful  in  increasing  subjects'  levels  of 
group identification.
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experiment. The aim of this pre-group PD was to observe subjects' propensity 
to cooperate, before any group assignment took place.
In stage 2, subjects  were separated into 6 groups,  red,  green,  blue,  purple, 
orange and  cyan.11 For  the remainder  of  the  experiment,  all  subjects  were 
identified to others by their group name, combined with an individual, within-
group number. (In this experiment, subjects were not informed of their own 
number.) After being assigned to their group, subjects took a collective quiz 
on  animal  group  names.  Subjects  could  communicate  with  other  group 
members via computer chat.12  The members of the group with the highest 
average  number  of  correct  answers  won  1000  ECU  each.  Other  groups 
received 100 ECU each. Announcement of the winning group took place after 
a final questionnaire was answered.
After  the  quiz,  in  stage  3,  subjects  were  paired  with  subjects  from  other 
groups, identified by group name and player number, and played a one-shot 
11 Most sessions consisted of 18 subjects in 6 groups of 3. However, due to no-shows, some 
sessions  had  fewer  subjects  and  one  session  had  only  5  groups.  Subjects  were  not 
explicitly informed of the groups' sizes.
12 We required  subjects  not  to  reveal  personal  information  during  the  chat.  All  subjects 
obeyed  this  instruction.  Chat  messages  were  almost  exclusively  focused  on  the  quiz 
answers.
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PD, just as in Experiment 1. Afterwards, as before, subjects were shown their 
partner's choices and the resulting payoffs. 
Finally,  in  stage  4,  subjects  made  6  allocation  decisions  allocating  money 
between themselves and another participant (the “target”). 3 of these decisions 
were dictator games, with a “taking” frame: the target was endowed with 1000 
ECU, and subjects could take up to 1000 ECU from the target for themselves. 
This  dictator  game was played once against  a member of the PD partner's 
group (but not the PD partner himself: subjects knew this because a history of 
play, including player numbers, was visible on screen), once against a member 
of a  third group subjects  had not previously any interacted with,  and once 
against a member of the subject's own group. Again, we refer to these groups 
as the Partner, Other and Own groups. We do not analyse choices against the 
Own group further  in  this  paper.13 The  remaining  3  decisions  were  costly 
punishment games in which subjects chose the number of ECU to deduct from 
the other subject's payoff. Subjects chose x between 0 and 300; they received 
400-x and  the  target  received  900-3x.  Again  this  game  was  played  once 
against  members  of  the  Partner,  Other,  and  Own  groups.  The  order  of 
allocation tasks was randomized.  
After  the experiment,  subjects  answered a  questionnaire.  Then the winning 
group of the quiz, the result of the stage 1 PD, and the stage(s) chosen for 
13 We intend to examine these decisions in separate work on in-group favoritism.
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payment were revealed. Finally,  subjects were called up and paid privately, 
receiving in addition a GBP 5 showup fee. For 5 of the 10 sessions one of the 
four different stages was selected for payment; in the other 5 sessions, either 
stages 1 and 2, or stages 3 and 4 were paid. Under the first payment method 
(selection of one stage only), if the stage 3 PD is paid, then the subject's stage 
4 allocations are not paid. This allows us to examine whether others' intentions 
alone suffice to induce group reciprocity,  or whether those intentions  must 
also  have  material  results.  We  found  few  consistent  differences  between 
behaviour under the two payment methods, so we pool them in the subsequent 
analysis.14 Table 6 shows descriptive statistics for Experiment 2.
N 172
Demographics
Male 78 (45.35%)
Age Min 17, max 42, mean 20.8, median 20
Studying:
… Law 9 (5.23%) … Natural sciences 29 (16.86%)
… Social sciences 23 (13.37%) … Other 79 (45.93%)
… Economics 32 (18.60%) … Not a student 0 (0.00%)
Prisoner's Dilemma choices (self, partner)
CC 80 (46.51%) DC 36 (20.93%)
CD 36 (20.93%) DD 20 (11.63%)
Allocations (ECU allocated to target, min / median / mean / max)
Dictator, vs Partner 0 / 10 / 241 / 1000 Dictator, vs Other 0 / 6 / 235 / 1000
Punishment,vs Partner 0 / 900 / 762 / 900 Punishment, vs Other 0 / 900 / 763 / 900
TABLE 6: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, EXPERIMENT 2
14 See the Appendix.
26
Figure 2 shows empirical Cumulative Distribution Functions of the amounts 
given to  the other  subject,  in  the “dictator”  or  “taking”  choice,  and in  the 
“punishment” choice, split up by PD partner behaviour. The first row shows 
amounts  given  by  all  subjects.  The  second  row  shows  amounts  given  by 
subjects who themselves cooperated in the PD. Three facts stand out. First, 
most subjects gave either 500 or nothing in the taking choice, quite typically 
for dictator games (Engel 2010; see Bardsley 2008 for a dictator game with a 
taking  frame),  and  most  subjects  did  not  punish  (i.e.  gave  900)  in  the 
punishment  choice.  Second,  subjects  became  more  selfish  in  the  dictator 
choices  if  their  PD  partners  defected.  Third,  in  punishment  choices, 
cooperators appear to have punished the Partner group more, but the Other 
group less, if their PD partners defected.
The data is highly non-normal. In the punishment decisions, more than half of 
our subjects chose to give the maximum amount of 900 ECU. We therefore 
analyse the data using a Tobit model: f(x) = min{x, 900} in equation (1). We 
use the semi-parametric estimator defined by Honore (1992), which removes 
the subject-specific fixed effects by a process analogous to first-differencing, 
and which does not rely on assumptions about the functional form of the errors 
εi,g. The dictator decisions are more complex: many subjects gave 0 ECU, and 
many gave 500 ECU, with some donations  between 0 and 500 and a  few 
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above 500. We analysed these using a fixed effects Tobit with f(x)=max{x,0} 
in (1)15. 
15 We also tried a fixed effects ordered logit estimator using the approach of Baetschmann et 
al. (2011), categorizing the amount given as 0, 1-499, 500, or above 500. The results are 
qualitatively similar to those reported here, and are available on request.
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FIGURE 2: EMPIRICAL CDF PLOTS OF AMOUNTS GIVEN, EXPERIMENT 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Decision Punishment Punishment Punishment Dictator Dictator Dictator
Pgrp 150 -476.17 -296.56 -33.04 -206.14 25.4
(162.85) (317.49) (206.84) (58.69) (106.46)+ (141.58) 
Pgrp × ...
Self D -107.58 -212.23 -91.79 -38.01 11.85 9.35
(190.17) (181.68) (187.04) (84.74) (74.09) (79.91) 
Partner D -376.12 -364.64 -426.67 -49.73 26.43 17.45
(277) (177.36)* (137.63)** (85.42) (78) (86.36) 
Self D × 
Partner D 443.56 599.8 391.1 167.11 6.77 30.06
(302.65) (216.55)** (262.58) (125.2) (97.39) (102.96) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Session 
dummies
No No Yes No No Yes
Controls:  Z=(gender,  group  colour,  economics  student,  session  %  male,  Partner  group 
decision taken before Other group decision). Session % male omitted when session dummies 
included. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
TABLE 7: FE TOBIT REGRESSIONS, EXPERIMENT 2
Table 7 shows the results. Columns 1-3 are regressions on the amount given in 
the punishment decisions. The first column is a simple regression on Self D, 
Partner D and their interaction, without controls. The second column adds a 
vector of controls to Z in equation (1). As before, appropriate controls should 
increase  the  efficiency  of  our  estimates.  (The  Honore  estimator  does  not 
estimate the fixed effects, nor effects for variables that are constant across a 
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group, so we cannot include controls in  X in (1).) Controls include dummies 
for gender, for subjects who studied economics, and for subjects' colour group; 
in addition we include a measure of the proportion of male subjects in the 
whole session, since this varied quite widely and we considered that it might 
affect levels of group reciprocity, and a dummy for the order of the Partner 
group and Other group decisions. Column 3 adds session fixed effects. The 
coefficient on PD partner defection is consistently large and negative, and is 
more precisely estimated when controls are included. The coefficient on the 
interaction of partner defection and own defection is large and positive; the 
sum of these two coefficients (i.e. ζ+η in equation (1))  is never significantly 
different from 0. Columns 4-6 are regressions on the amount given in dictator 
decisions.  The coefficients on both  Partner D and  Self  D × Partner D are 
small and not statistically significant. Thus, subjects who cooperated in the PD 
responded to PD partner defection by giving less to members of the Partner 
group, but only in punishment decisions, where harming the other participant 
was costly to the subject. 
These  results  conformed  to  the  basic  pattern  of  Experiment  1:  group 
reciprocity was observed in punishment decisions but not in dictator decisions. 
In addition, group reciprocity was observed only among those who themselves 
cooperated in the PD. This finding could be interpreted in two ways. Subjects 
may  react  strongly  to  betrayal  in  the  PD,  but  not  to  mutual  defection. 
31
Alternatively, subjects who are in general more cooperative may react more to 
others'  defection,  whether or not they themselves cooperated in a particular 
instance (but these subjects are also more likely to cooperate in the PD). To 
distinguish between these two explanations, Experiment 2 included an initial, 
anonymous Prisoner's Dilemma without feedback, before subjects were placed 
into groups. We use subjects' behaviour in this first PD to categorize them as 
cooperative or non-cooperative “types”. Decisions in the first and second PD 
were  correlated:  about  50% of  cooperators  in  the  first  PD defected  in  the 
second PD, while about 75% of defectors in the first PD defected again in the 
second (chi-squared test, p<0.01).
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(1) (2) (3)
Decision Punishment Punishment Punishment
Pgrp 161 -521.99 -441.22
(186.83) (271.53) + (371.62) 
Pgrp × ...
Self D -78 -44.88 -32.31
(236.31) (183.21) (241.76) 
Partner D -248 -291.5 -195.76
(257.7) (208.29) (188.54) 
Self D × Partner D 303.85 408.83 162.7
(308.61) (255.08) (318.56) 
Self D1 -86 132.05 78.63
(194.64) (219.16) (194.49) 
Self D1 × Self D -33.76 -237.23 -242.24
(258.73) (303.34) (437.06) 
Self D1 × Partner D -427.01 -275.75 -444.21
(321.15) (364.69) (366.1) 
Self D1 × Self D × Partner D 437.41 324.72 747.73
(384.82) (472.07) (592.28) 
Summed coefficients:
Self D + (Self D1 × Self D) -111.75 -355.36 -284.26
(105.34) (207.64) + (229.61) 
Partner D + (Self D1 × Partner D) -675 -603.62 -641.13
(191.65) *** (272.32) * (271.71) *
Self D × Partner D + (Self D1 × Self D × 
Partner D) 741.25 804.35 902.42
(229.88) ** (344.13) * (352.8) *
Controls No Yes Yes
Session dummies No No Yes
Controls:  Z=(gender,  group  colour,  economics  student,  session  % male,  Partner  group 
decision  taken  before  Other  group  decision).  Session  %  male  omitted  when  session 
dummies included. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** 
p < 0.001.
TABLE 8: FE TOBIT REGRESSIONS, INTERACTIONS WITH INITIAL PD
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Table 8 adds Self D1, a dummy taking the value 1 if subjects defected in the 
initial anonymous PD, to the first 3 regressions of Table 7, and interacts it with 
Partner D and Self D. If the size of the Partner D × Self D interaction in Table
7 is genuinely caused by betrayal in the main PD, then the Self D1 coefficient 
should not be significant. On the other hand, if the interaction arises because 
people with cooperative personalities react more strongly to partner defection, 
then the interactions with Self D should lose significance, and interactions with 
Self D1 should be significant instead. In fact,  Self D1 and its interactions are 
never significant, and, as the “summed coefficient” rows show, the effect of 
partner defection is consistently larger for subjects who  defected in stage 1. 
Thus,  behaviour  in  the initial  PD does  not  help to  explain why “betrayal” 
causes more group reciprocal behaviour than mutual defection. We conclude 
that only betrayal induces group reciprocity, and that it does so among both 
more and less cooperative subjects.
Social identity theorists argue that intergroup discrimination is caused by the 
level of people's identification with their own group – the extent to which they 
perceive themselves as part of the group and take on its interests as their own 
(Tajfel  et  al.  1971;  Tajfel  1982).  We  were  interested  in  whether  group 
identification  could  help  explain  group-reciprocal  behaviour.  In  both 
experiments,  the  final  questionnaire  included  questions  measuring  group 
identification,  adapted  from Ellemers  et  al.  (1999).  We created  a  variable 
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Group ID by summing answers to these questions.16 Table 9 reproduces the 
first 3 columns of  Table 7, interacting the other independent variables with 
Group ID. We expected that subjects who showed higher identification with 
their group would be more likely to group-reciprocate. In fact, while  Group 
ID itself predicts less giving to the partner group, its interaction terms are not 
significant.  Indeed,  the  effect  of  partner  defection  is  stronger  among those 
with lower Group ID. Thus, group identification does not seem to be a useful 
predictor of group reciprocal behaviour.
16 Results using an alternative Group ID variable, derived from the questionnaire scores by 
factor analysis, were very similar to those shown here.
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(1) (2) (3)
Decision Punishment Punishment Punishment
Pgrp -68.41 -804.2 -192.26
(102.13) (425.85) + (439.18) 
Pgrp × ...
Self D 148.64 171.15 120.69
(173.06) (178.72) (250.75) 
Partner D -331.28 -238.14 -257
(248.02) (329.72) (240.09) 
Self D × Partner D 361.42 288.59 217.99
(293.75) (344.95) (369.31) 
Group ID -50.74 -45.52 -38.91
(17.61) ** (19.36) * (28.34) 
Group ID × Self D 30.03 26.56 23.83
(23.97) (21.83) (34.51) 
Group ID × Partner D 5.27 21.47 12.71
(41.33) (49.08) (28.01) 
Group ID × Self D × Partner D 14.84 -1.58 1.92
(44.85) (49.61) (39.63) 
Effect of Partner D at...
first quartile Group ID -362.87 -426.54 -297.19
(155.12) * (161.31) ** (205.57) 
third quartile Group ID -304.95 -178.86 -125.08
(432.06) (574.97) (327.21) 
Controls No Yes Yes
Session dummies No No Yes
Controls:  Z=(gender,  group  colour,  economics  student,  session  % male,  Partner  group 
decision  taken  before  Other  group  decision).  Session  %  male  omitted  when  session 
dummies included. Group ID was centered at its median. Standard errors in parentheses. + 
p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
TABLE 9: FE TOBIT REGRESSIONS, INTERACTIONS WITH GROUP IDENTITY, 
EXPERIMENT 2
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Experiments involving lab-created groups can run the risk of demand effects, 
in  which  subjects  follow  norms  implicitly  suggested  by  the  experimental 
design. We took steps to minimize this risk. For example, we randomized the 
order of allocation decisions, so as to avoid obvious pairings of similar choices 
made  vis-à-vis  Partner  and Other  group members.  We also  asked subjects 
about  the  experiment's  purpose  in  the  final  questionnaire.  Many  subjects 
answered  that  the  experiment  was  about  teamwork;  only  a  few  (7  in 
Experiment  1;  3  in  Experiment  2)  mentioned  e.g.  “revenge” or  related 
concepts. Rerunning our analyses without these subjects does not affect our 
results.
Interpretation
The  results  above,  coming  from  a  new  experimental  design,  need  to  be 
interpreted with care. Nevertheless, we here draw some initial conclusions.
Firstly  and  most  importantly:  taken  together,  our  experiments  provide 
evidence for group reciprocity. Some subjects responded to their PD partner's 
defection by reducing their allocations specifically to other members of the 
partner's group, even at a cost to themselves. Group reciprocity was observed 
in  the  absence  of  strategic  incentives,  supporting  a  preferences-based 
explanation. 
37
Second,  group  reciprocity  did  not  affect  all  decisions  equally.   We  saw 
significant  evidence  for  it  only  in  choices where  the  Pareto-dominant 
allocation  would  give  subjects  less  than  the  other  participant,  but  subjects 
could  pay  to  lower  the  discrepancy.  This  is  surprising,  since  we  did  not 
observe group reciprocation in the dictator games, where subjects could have 
punished  costlessly  (indeed  at  a  profit).  One  possibility  is  that  group 
punishment does not obey the law of demand (cf. Anderson and Putterman 
2006).
Lastly, not all subjects group-reciprocated. Indeed, the majority of subjects did 
not discriminate between groups. More cooperative subjects, as measured by 
an initial anonymous PD, were not more likely to group-reciprocate than less 
cooperative ones,  conditional  on their  choice to cooperate in the main PD. 
Also, group reciprocal behaviour was not predicted by psychological measures 
of  group  identification,  which  suggests  that  a  different  psychological 
mechanism  is  at  work  than  that  posited  by  Social  Identity  Theory.  Other 
psychological  theories  not  tested  here,  such  as  social  dominance  theory 
(Sidanius and Pratto 1999), might have more explanatory power.
Conclusion
In recent years, evidence from laboratory and field experiments has challenged 
the  motivational  assumption  of  material  self-interest,  introducing  concerns 
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such  as  fairness  and  reciprocity.  One  so  far  under-emphasized  factor,  we 
believe, is that humans, who often act in groups, often also treat other groups 
as actors. They may therefore assign blame and praise to groups as well as 
individuals – with important consequences for human society and politics. At 
times in history, entire groups have been blamed and scapegoated for their 
members' real or imagined behaviour. Laboratory experiments could help in 
understanding  the  processes  behind  this  phenomenon.  In  our  experiments, 
subjects  responded  to  one  group  member's  behaviour  by  treating  other 
members of that group differently.
Discriminatory behaviour may be driven by beliefs rather than by preferences. 
For example,  ethnic  discrimination  in hiring may come from  statistical  or 
screening  discrimination  (Arrow  1972)  rather  than  from  a  “taste  for 
discrimination” (Becker 1957). In our experiments, strategic incentives were 
ruled  out: group  reciprocity  appears  to  be  a  matter  of  pure  preference. 
However,  we  caution  against  too  narrow  an  interpretation  of  this.  Group 
reciprocity may be due to the activation of context-specific norms, rather than 
to “preferences” thought of as unchanging characteristics of individuals.
The majority of our subjects did not exhibit group reciprocity, and it was not 
visible  in  all  decisions.  To  investigate  the  causes  and  correlates  of  group 
reciprocity,  our  experimental  paradigm  needs  further  refinement. 
Complementary experiments could be done using homegrown identities such 
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as ethnicity. Lastly, we have still to investigate third-party group reciprocity, 
in which people retaliate against a group for harm done not to themselves, but 
to a fellow group member of theirs.
Demonstrating  group  reciprocity  in  a  reproducible  laboratory  experiment 
could  open  the  door  to  deeper  exploration  of  how it  works.  We draw an 
analogy with the minimal group paradigm in psychology. After Sherif's initial 
research  in  the  1950s  on  in-group  prejudice,  the  famous  Robber's  Cave 
experiment  (Sherif  1961),  researchers  developed  a  canonical  experimental 
paradigm to analyse in-group prejudice (Tajfel  et al.  1971). By making the 
behaviour of interest  reproducible,  the minimal group paradigm catalysed a 
productive tradition of research on prejudice.  We hope that our experiment 
will similarly encourage further study of this phenomenon under controlled 
conditions. This could be a valuable complement to field study of the often 
extreme situations where group reciprocity produces its most visible effects.
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Appendix: further statistical analyses
For online publication
The  experiment  questionnaire  asked  if  subjects  had  met  any  of  the  other 
participants before. Some subjects (39) answered that they had. These subjects 
might have had strategic motivations for behaving in a certain way if  they 
expected to meet these subjects again. We are not very concerned about this, 
because  all  decisions  were  anonymous  and  subjects'  roles  were  assigned 
randomly.  Nevertheless,  Table  10 reruns  the  basic  regressions  of  Table  7, 
excluding all these subjects. Results are basically unchanged.
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Decision Punishment Punishment Punishment Dictator Dictator Dictator
Pgrp 173.5 -677.06 -368.19 56.67 -184.6 -16.21
(186.34) (248.01) ** (317.93) (40.49) (90.92) * (139.17) 
Pgrp × ...
Self D -93.19 -83.59 -108.3 -11.28 3.91 -4.5
(210.62) (179.9) (176.24) (81.95) (61.36) (62.28) 
Partner D -282.36 -405.56 -313.14 -141.67 -38.59 -58.69
(253.45) (176.97) * (142.85) * (79.94) + (64.2) (69.85) 
Self D × 
Partner D 281.85 419.38 357.27 146.84 51.2 117.16
(285.49) (215.59) + (232.29) (138.3) (96.59) (112.22) 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Session 
dummies
No No Yes No No Yes
N 133 133 133 133 133 133
Controls:  Z=(gender,  group  colour,  economics  student,  session  % male,  Partner  group 
decision  taken  before  Other  group  decision).  Session  %  male  omitted  when  session 
dummies included. Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** 
p < 0.001.
TABLE 10: FE TOBITS EXCLUDING SUBJECTS WHO HAD MET OTHER 
PARTICIPANTS, EXPERIMENT 2
Sessions 6-10 of Experiment 2 used a different payment method, paying either 
both stages 1 and 2, or both stages 3 and 4 (the PD and the allocations). Table
11 adds a dummy Payboth to columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 of  Table 7, and interacts it 
with Self D, Partner D and their interaction. Results are not very clear. The 
Payboth dummy interacts significantly with Partner D in the regression on 
punishment choices in column 1,  but the coefficient is much smaller and 
insignificant when controls are added. There is also a significant interaction in 
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the controlled regression on dictator choices (column 4). However, neither the 
coefficient on Partner D itself, nor the summed coefficient Partner D + 
Payboth × Partner D, is significantly different from zero. Overall, we think it 
reasonable to pool the sessions for analysis, as in the main text.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Decision Punishment Punishment Dictator Dictator
Pgrp 183.81 -473.66 -91.66 -308.2
(219.9) (279.66) + (98.92) (181.86) +
Pgrp × ...
Self D -12.6 -36.81 47.92 133.93
(254.35) (221.53) (134.25) (141.62) 
Partner D -735.23 -415.15 -7.08 205.59
(282.64) ** (265.28) (147.13) (142.73) 
Self D × Partner D 687.43 416.67 144.33 -150.3
(341) * (315.26) (194.38) (161.18) 
Payboth -123.81 -61.5 160.14 120.86
(229.2) (286.23) (106.86) (162.02) 
Payboth × Self D -253.09 -154 -216.4 -187.51
(278.98) (348.57) (162.4) (148.29) 
Payboth × Partner D 678.23 77.73 -131.38 -303.39
(329.11) * (395.97) (167.77) (139.4) *
Payboth × Self D × 
Partner D -324.16 211.31 56.15 224.67
(398.28) (472.67) (239.47) (181.93) 
Controls No Yes No Yes
Controls:  Z=(gender,  group  colour,  economics  student,  session  % male,  Partner  group 
decision taken before Other group decision). Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10; * 
p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
TABLE 11: FE TOBITS, INTERACTION WITH PAYMENT METHOD, EXPERIMENT 2
50
